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“CATCHY PHRASES THAT CONVEY A 
MESSAGE”: THE DANGER OF TAM’S 
COPYMARK CREEP AND TRADEMARK 
LAW’S NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 
ANALYSIS 
Stacey M. Lantagne 
In 2017, the Supreme Court decided Matal v. Tam, in which an Asian-
American band called The Slants challenged the Patent and Trademark Office’s 
refusal to register the mark based on its disparaging nature. In a First-
Amendment-focused opinion, the Supreme Court positioned trademarks as im-
portant expressive speech that must be protected as such. In so doing, the Su-
preme Court distorted the important foundations of trademark protection that 
had distinguished it from copyrights, putting the two on effectively equal footing. 
The Supreme Court’s decision makes fully explicit an ongoing blurring of 
the lines between copyright and trademark, as virtually all speech has come to be 
understood as essentially commercial, rendering commercial speech therefore al-
so expressive by default. Copyright holders have sought to treat their copyrights 
more like trademarks, wishing to expand them indefinitely to protect their status 
as the source of particular creative franchises. Meanwhile, as the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Tam illustrates, trademark holders have sought to treat their 
trademarks more like copyrights, proposing artistic expression rather than com-
mercial transactions. 
This Article contrasts the analysis of Tam with previous disparaging trade-
mark cases, highlighting how Tam shifts trademark analysis from its traditional 
considerations of commerce and marketplace into a discussion of traditional 
copyright considerations of expressive creativity and artistic viewpoints. This Ar-
ticle argues that Tam’s treatment of trademarks, carried to its natural conclu-
sion, could have the result of hollowing out many trademark law ideals, such as 
protecting consumers from deception, encouraging effective and efficient market-
place competition, and defending public discourse from commercial ownership. 
This Article concludes that there is value in maintaining the separation of trade-
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marks and copyrights and remembering their separate foundational values, in 
order to protect all speech from now seemingly inevitable commodification. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 1990s, a class of Native Americans challenged the trademark regis-
trations for REDSKINS, the Washington, D.C. football team, based on a sec-
tion of the trademark statute that prohibited disparaging trademarks.1 The case 
got tangled in a number of procedural thickets,2 but eventually resulted in a rul-
ing that focused closely on the unique nature and benefits of the trademark reg-
istration scheme.3 
Last year, the Supreme Court decided a similar case, Matal v. Tam, in 
which an Asian-American band called The Slants challenged the Trademark 
Office’s refusal to register the mark based on its disparaging nature.4 The Su-
preme Court’s ruling ignored the unique nature and benefits of trademark regis-
tration in favor of a First Amendment-focused opinion that equated trademarks 
with expressive speech. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tam reflects the extent to which com-
mercial speech has come to be viewed as creative speech. The lines that we 
previously used to divide copyright and trademark into separate doctrines have 
been gradually breaking down. In a previous article, The Copymark Creep, I 
examined this phenomenon from the point of view of copyright law, detailing 
 
1  Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 62 F. Supp. 3d 498, 500 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
2  See e.g., id. at 500–01. 
3  See id. at 508–09. 
4  See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1754 (2017). 
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how various copyright holders have begun to treat their copyrights like trade-
marks.5 
Tam indicates that the copymark creep is happening from the other side, 
too: various trademark holders have begun to treat their trademarks as operat-
ing more like copyrights, and the Supreme Court in Tam has stamped approval 
on this approach. This conflation of the two doctrines threatens to undercut the 
purpose of both and leave us with the effectiveness of neither. 
This Article begins by discussing the analytical structure of disparaging 
trademark cases prior to Tam, with a particular focus on the REDSKINS litiga-
tions. This Article then contrasts the analysis of Tam, highlighting how Tam 
shifts trademark analysis from its traditional considerations of commerce and 
marketplace confusion into a discussion of traditional copyright considerations 
of expressive creativity and political viewpoints. Thereafter, the Article exam-
ines the implications of this shift and the impact it could have on many other 
traditional trademark law doctrines, arguing that Tam’s analytical underpin-
nings, carried to their natural conclusions, have the result of hollowing out 
many traditional trademark law ideals, such as protecting consumers from de-
ception and encouraging effective marketplace competition. It has the addition-
al critical effect of making vulnerable the robust exchange of ideas that it pur-
ports to protect. This Article concludes that trademark law as a body of law 
separate from copyright law serves important consumer-protection functions 
that should not be gutted in the name of protecting creative expression, when 
copyright law exists to do just that. 
I. TRADEMARKS AND THEIR EXPRESSIVENESS 
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof . . . [used] to identify and distinguish . . . goods . . . from those manu-
factured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods . . . .”6 Con-
gress enacted the first federal trademark system in 1870.7 However, in 1879 the 
Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional, warning Congress that its power to 
regulate trademarks stemmed from the Constitution’s Commerce Clause and 
thus any statute had to be positioned within that clause’s auspices.8 There was  
a series of challenges to this idea, asserting that in fact trademarks should be 
lumped in with copyrights under the Constitution’s Copyright Clause.9 Howev-
er, even the parties arguing the case themselves seemed dubious of the equiva-
 
5  Stacey M. Lantagne, The Copymark Creep: How the Normative Standards of Fan Com-
munities Can Rescue Copyright, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 462 (2016). 
6  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018). 
7  1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:3 
(5th ed. 2019). 
8  Id. 
9  See id. 
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lency of trademarks and copyrights,10 and the Supreme Court unequivocally 
and unanimously rejected the idea, however, drawing a line around trademarks 
as symbols of commercial usage rather than the vehicles of creative expression 
for which copyright was designed: 
If we should endeavor to classify [trademarks] under the head of writings of au-
thors, the objections are . . . strong. In this, . . . originality is required. And while 
the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original 
designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is only such as are original, and are found-
ed in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected are 
the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engrav-
ings, and the like. The trade-mark may be, and generally is, the adoption of 
something already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party using it. At 
common law the exclusive right to it grows out of its use, and not its mere adop-
tion. By the act of Congress this exclusive right attaches upon registration. But 
in neither case does it depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of 
the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It 
is simply founded on priority of appropriation.11 
From this initial foundation that trademarks concerned commerce, Con-
gress put together legislation that eventually became the Lanham Act, the fed-
eral statute that governs distinctive symbols being used in commerce to identify 
goods and services.12 This regulation of trademarks is explicitly marketplace-
focused: trademarks do not exist until they are being used in commerce,13 cease 
to exist once they cease being used in commerce,14 and are defined in scope by 
how they are being used in commerce.15 This can be contrasted with copy-
rights, which protect all original works of expression fixed in a tangible medi-
um, regardless of their use in commerce or not.16 
Although separate from copyrighted works, the fact that trademarks are de-
fined as being symbols means that they necessarily communicate an idea in the 
same way that expressive copyrights do. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s defini-
tion of the proper range of possibilities that can serve as trademarks explicitly 
defines them as “anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning.”17 Howev-
 
10  See Zvi S. Rosen, In Search of the Trade-Mark Cases: The Nascent Treaty Power and the 
Turbulent Origins of Federal Trademark Law, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 827, 860–61 (2009) 
(citations omitted) (“[T]he Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution was already 
roundly rejected by the legal community as a rationale for trademark legislation. The Attor-
ney General recognized this, and . . . it was not argued seriously. . . . The brief of Coudert 
Brothers on behalf of the Kunkelmann & Co. against Wittemann did not even mention the 
Intellectual Property Clause, effectively dismissing it out of hand. Rather, like the Mumm 
Brief, it argued for the Commerce Clause . . . .”). 
11  In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
12  15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2018). 
13  See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 16:8. 
14  See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 17:4. 
15  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:6. 
16  See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) (noting that works are protected even when they are not pub-
lished to the public). 
17  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). 
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er, the meaning the Court was referring to was the marketplace-based meaning 
of trademarks: “[C]ustomers may come to treat a particular color on a product 
or its packaging . . . as signifying a brand. And, if so, that color would have 
come to identify and distinguish the goods—i.e., ‘to indicate’ their ‘source’ 
. . . .”18 When trademarks carried meanings that went beyond their marketplace 
meanings, courts treated them carefully, concerned about using trademark law 
to award ownership of expression. 
For instance, in the case of descriptive word marks, the statute and its ap-
plication by courts confines trademark ownership to a showing of secondary 
meaning.19 This secondary meaning is the trademark meaning of the descriptive 
term,20 and the trademark holder’s ownership rights are limited to that second-
ary meaning.21 The word still exists in its primary meaning for all to use.22 
Those who choose descriptive marks choose them at their own peril, as courts 
do not hesitate to limit the scope of their protection to maintain the words’ ex-
pressive meaning for use by others.23 
Likewise, in cases where the parties were suing over a use in question that 
was not commercial, but instead artistic or creative, then courts recognized that 
such speech was not a true trademark dispute and instead implicated First 
Amendment concerns not ordinarily raised in the trademark context.24 This was 
necessitated by the fact that the mark in question had been taken out of the 
marketplace, and so had ceased functioning as a mark and instead gained ex-
pressive qualities.25 In these situations, courts were generally careful not to use 
trademark protection to stifle expression.26 
 
18  Id. at 163; see also S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 534 
(1987). 
19  See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 11:25. 
20  See id. § 15:1 (“[I]f a designation is not used as a mark to identify and distinguish source, 
it cannot possibly achieve a secondary meaning.”). 
21  See id. § 15:6. 
22  See id. § 15:1 (“The original ‘primary meaning’ . . . does not disappear, but continues 
. . . .”). 
23  See e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 
(2004) (“The common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of con-
sumers followed from the very fact that in cases like this one an originally descriptive term 
was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the undesirability of allowing anyone to 
obtain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first.”). 
24  See Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003); Stewart Surfboards, 
Inc. v. Disney Book Grp., LLC, No. CV 10-2982 GAF (SSx), 2011 WL 12877019, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011) (“Trademark law traditionally applies to commercial uses of 
marks.”). The many cases applying the Second Circuit’s Rogers test also attest to the differ-
ent treatments of trademark use versus expressive use. See id. 
25  See e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002). 
26  See Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 325 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Trademark 
protections exist neither to allow companies to protect themselves from criticism nor to ‘con-
trol language.’ ”); Taubman, 319 F.3d at 778 (“Mishkoff has a First Amendment right to ex-
press his opinion about Taubman, and as long as his speech is not commercially misleading, 
the Lanham Act cannot be summoned to prevent it.”). 
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II. TRADITIONAL DISPARAGEMENT ANALYSES 
If one’s theory of trademarks is as marketplace tools (as twentieth-century 
jurisprudence held trademarks to be, relying on nineteenth-century precedent) 
rather than as modes of creative expression, then it makes sense that statutes 
would seek to regulate marketplace concerns rather than First Amendment con-
cerns. Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act was just such a marketplace regula-
tion. It prohibited the registration of trademarks that were “immoral, deceptive, 
or scandalous . . . [or] which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection 
with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring 
them into contempt, or disrepute . . . .”27 In determining disparagement specifi-
cally, the Patent and Trademark Office (the PTO) examined “the meaning of 
the matter in question, as it appears in the marks and as those marks are used in 
connection with the goods and services identified in the registrations,” and 
whether “the meaning of the marks . . . may disparage.”28 The relevant impact 
to measure was that of the allegedly disparaged group,29 of which a “substantial 
composite” must have considered the mark as used disparaging.30 In judging 
the disparaging nature of the mark, courts looked to dictionary evidence; 
“scholarly, literary, and media references;” and timely statements made by 
members of the group themselves.31 
The case In re Geller32 gave the Federal Circuit an opportunity to apply 
this test, using trademark precedent to describe the analysis as: 
(1) what is the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into account not 
only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to the other el-
ements in the mark, the nature of the goods or services, and the manner in which 
the mark is used in the marketplace in connection with the goods or services; 
and (2) if that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, be-
liefs or national symbols, whether that meaning may be disparaging to a sub-
stantial composite of the referenced group.33 
The court then used this test to analyze the proposed mark “STOP THE 
ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA” to use for the service of “[p]roviding infor-
mation regarding understanding and preventing terrorism.”34 The court con-
cluded that the word “Islamisation” had a religious meaning against the appli-
cant’s objection that it was entirely political.35 Whether the meaning was 
 
27  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2018). 
28  Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *4 
(T.T.A.B. June 18, 2014) (citations omitted). 
29  See id. (citations omitted). 
30  In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 
31  Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 472 (E.D. Va. 2015), vacated, 709 
F. App’x 182 (4th Cir. 2018). 
32  In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
33  Id. at 1358 (quoting In Re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1215, 1217 (T.T.A.B. 
2010)). 
34  Id. at 1357. 
35  See id. at 1359–60. 
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political or religious, however, both meanings referred to people of the Islamic 
faith.36 In the context in which it was being used, coupled with the word “stop,” 
the court found the mark to be disparaging of American Muslims.37 
The Federal Circuit’s analysis was typical of the disparagement analysis 
regularly used to block registration of marks like KHORAN,38 HEEB,39 and 
SQUAW40. However, marks like JAP,41 MOONIES,42 and BUDDHA 
BEACHWEAR43 had been allowed. Nevertheless, while individual decisions 
under the statute had sometimes been perplexing,44 the statute persisted for over 
seventy years.45 
Courts had traditionally upheld as constitutional the PTO’s refusals to reg-
ister marks partly because the Lanham Act’s regulatory focus on commercial 
speech set it in a less protected First Amendment arena.46 Courts were also 
supportive of the statute because, it was often argued, the refusal of registration 
did not affect the ability to use the mark.47 Trademark rights are not established 
by registration, only by use.48 There are many benefits to registration, including 
clarity of rights, aid in some circumstances in proving prima facie cases, assis-
tance at the border by U.S. Customs, and access to statutes protecting against 
 
36  See id. at 1361. 
37  See id. at 1361–62. 
38  In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215, 2010 WL 766488, at *1, *3 (T.T.A.B. 
Mar. 4, 2010). 
39  In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071, 2008 WL 5065114, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 
26, 2008). 
40  In re Squaw Valley Dev. Co., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264, 2006 WL 1546500, at *2, *23 
(T.T.A.B. June 2, 2006). 
41  See Japanese Am. Citizens League v. Takada, 171 U.S.P.Q. 109, 1971 WL 16634, at *1 
(N.Y. Spec. Term 1971). 
42  In re In Over Our Heads Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, 1990 WL 354546, at *1–2 (T.T.A.B. 
July 17, 1990). 
43  In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1376, 1994 WL 587037, at *1–2 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 23, 1994). 
44  See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1756–57 (2017); Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amend-
ment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration and Free Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
381, 413–14 (2016) [hereinafter Tushnet, First Amendment]. 
45  See Mark Conrad, Matal v. Tam—A Victory for The Slants, a Touchdown for the Red-
skins, but an Ambiguous Journey for the First Amendment and Trademark Law, 36 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 83, 96, 96 n.65–66 (2018). 
46  See Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003). 
47  In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2012), abrogated by In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 
1330 n.1, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981), overruled by In re Tam, 808 
F.3d 1321, 1330 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cine-
ma, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203, 203 n.3 (2d Cir. 1979); Michael Grynberg, A Trademark De-
fense of the Disparagement Bar, 126 YALE L.J. F. 178, 180 (2016); Niki Kuckes, Matal v. 
Tam: Free Speech Meets “Disparaging” Trademarks in the Supreme Court, 23 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 122, 126 (2018). 
48  In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Kuckes, su-
pra note 47, at 127–28. 
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counterfeiting.49 However, because registration does not create any rights, and 
because trademark holders can vindicate their marks in court regardless of reg-
istration, courts often espoused that a lack of registration had no meaningful, 
harmful effect on the trademark holder’s speech.50 Unregistered marks, after 
all, could be protected in court with “essentially the same protection as those 
that are registered.”51 Therefore, courts seemed more comfortable with enforc-
ing the disparagement statute, secure in their ability to assure the mark holders 
that they could still use and protect the mark.52 
A. The REDSKINS Saga 
The Washington Redskins football team chose its name in 1933 and regis-
tered its first trademark with the PTO in 1967.53 Controversies had dogged the 
name since at least the 1970s, with people accurately pointing out that it served 
as a racial slur.54 When a class of Native Americans challenged REDSKINS as 
disparaging, there was a lengthy debate about issues of laches and the relevant 
time period under which disparagement should be judged.55 But eventually, re-
lying on considerable evidence of the disparaging nature of the term “redskin,” 
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the TTAB) decided to cancel the 
REDSKINS mark—twice.56 Pro-Football, Inc., the owner of the football team, 
appealed the TTAB’s decision, alleging, among other things, that the dispar-
agement statute was unconstitutional.57 
 
49  Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283, 285 (4th Cir. 1973) (citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1051), abrogated on other grounds by NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 294 
(4th Cir. 1982); Tushnet, First Amendment, supra note 44, at 394. 
50  In re Boulevard Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 
at 484. 
51  ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 921 (6th Cir. 2003). 
52  In an analysis blocking registration of a mark under the related scandalous section, the 
Federal Circuit noted, 
Nothing in this decision precludes [the mark holder] from continuing to sell her merchandise 
under the mark at issue, or from seeking trademark protection for some other, otherwise regis-
trable element of her product’s design, dress, or labeling. If [the mark holder] is correct that the 
mark at issue ‘bring[s] [nothing] more than perhaps a smile to the face of the prospective pur-
chaser,’ . . . then the market will no doubt reward her ingenuity[, regardless of the mark’s regis-
tration status]. 
In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 639 (Fed. Cir. 2012), abrogated by In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1330 
n.1, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
53  Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 448 (E.D. Va. 2015), vacated, 709 
F. App’x 182 (4th Cir. 2018). 
54  Id. at 450. 
55  Id. at 448, 450. 
56  Id. at 450–51. 
57  See Pro-Football, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Further Support of its Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, and in Opposition to Defendants’ and the United States’ Motions for Sum-
mary Judgment, on Constitutional Claims III-VI at 5, 37, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 
No. 1:14-cv-1043-GBL-IDD, 2015 WL 4126449 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2015). 
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The district court upheld the ruling of the TTAB, relying on the sizable 
amount of precedent limiting the expressiveness of trademarks to marketplace 
considerations.58 Refusal to register a trademark, the court concluded, as courts 
had concluded before, did not infringe upon speech.59 The issue here, as the 
court was careful to emphasize, was not the trademark itself but its registration: 
As a threshold matter, throughout the pleadings the parties conflated the legal 
principles surrounding trademarks with those surrounding trademark registra-
tion. . . . [T]he Court is . . . compelled to highlight what is at issue in this case—
trademark registration, not the trademarks themselves. It is the registrations of 
the Redskins Marks that were scheduled for cancellation by the TTAB’s deci-
sion, not the trademarks. In fact, the TTAB itself pointed out that it is only em-
powered to cancel the statutory registration of the marks under Section 2(a); it 
cannot cancel the trademarks themselves. . . . Thus, regardless of this Court’s 
ruling, [the football team] can still use the Redskins Marks in commerce.60 
Even with the cancellation of the registration, the Washington football 
team could continue to use its REDSKINS trademark and continue to protect it 
in court.61 The cancellation, therefore, in the court’s view, had no effect on the 
ability of the Pro-Football Team to use and vindicate its chosen speech in the 
marketplace. The use of the mark, whether registered or not, gives it enforcea-
bility, and the Lanham Act specifically provides for the protection of unregis-
tered marks by courts.62 Registration of a mark is therefore not required, so 
those wishing to use disparaging marks, like the Washington football team, 
could continue to do so and continue to be protected in that choice.63 
The court focused closely on the harm from the cancellation of the regis-
tration, which it found was markedly different from a denial of use, which was 
not the situation here.64 “[T]he cancellations do not burden, restrict, or prohibit 
[the football team’s] ability to use the marks. . . . An owner’s ability to use the 
unregistered mark is unaffected.”65 
The only speech implicated by registration was the publication of the mark 
in the Principal Register, the database the government maintains of all of its 
registered trademarks.66 The Principal Register, the court found, is information-
al speech, informing the public of which trademarks the government is protect-
ing.67 This made it, in the court’s view, government speech:68 the Washington 
 
58  See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 455, 490 (E.D. Va. 2015), va-
cated, 709 F. App’x 182 (4th Cir. 2018). 
59  Id. at 455. 
60  Id. at 453. 
61  See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 27:14. 
62  Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 454. 
63  Id. at 464. 
64  Id. at 453. 
65  Id. at 455–56. 
66  Id. at 457. 
67  See id. 
68  Id. 
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football team could do whatever it wanted with its trademark; in forcing regis-
tration, the only thing the football team would gain, in the court’s view, was 
forcing the government to speak about the mark by putting it on the Principal 
Register.69 The denial of registration, in contrast to a denial of use of a trade-
mark, which was not at issue here, simply was not a matter of denial of free 
speech.70 
Therefore, this court focused on government speech. The registration 
communicated government approval of the trademark,71 the public closely as-
sociated registration with the government,72 and the government exercised edi-
torial control over what appears in the Principal Register by approving or deny-
ing registration.73 The registration of the trademark, the court found, was “a 
declaration by the federal government” of approval of the mark.74 The govern-
ment was also the literal speaker, because the government publishes the Princi-
pal Register.75 
The court did find that the government is not required to defend any of the 
trademarks on the Principal Register.76 If someone takes issue with one of 
them, the court noted, it is the private party that defends it in court.77 This, the 
court admitted, weighed in favor of the trademark registration being private 
speech rather than government speech.78 But this understates the government’s 
role in litigation of federally registered trademarks. While the government 
might not be in court filing papers, the registration does serve as prima facie 
evidence of the validity of the trademark.79 Therefore, the very first step of any 
trademark litigation—proving that there is a valid mark—is handled by the 
government registration. Moreover, the government’s initial examination of 
trademarks is meant, inter alia, to protect existing registrations from confusing 
marks, so that the government is expending resources in protecting the marks 
on the Principal Register from ever having to vindicate their rights in litiga-
tion.80 The government, therefore, does play a meaningful role in defense of 
trademarks.81 
 
69  Id. at 459. 
70  Id. at 457. 
71  Id. at 458. 
72  Id. at 458–59. 
73  Id. at 459. 
74  Id. at 461. 
75  Id. 
76  See id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. at 462. 
79  6 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 32:138. 
80  See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (noting that there is “direct gov-
ernment protection of the mark in that the PTO searches its records and refuses registrations 
to others of conflicting marks.”), overruled by In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1330 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (noting that there is “direct government protection of the mark in that the PTO search-
es its records and refuses registrations to others of conflicting marks”); Drew Jurgensen, 
When All You Have is a Hammer, Everything Looks Like a Nail: In re Tam and the Federal 
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The trademark registration program was created by Congress, and when 
Congress creates programs, it can create that program’s limits.82 Previous 
courts found that Congress was seeking to avoid “occupy[ing] the time, ser-
vices, and use of funds of the federal government” with enforcing certain types 
of marks.83 
The Pro-Football court concluded with a correct statement of trademark 
law: “Courts do not create trademarks . . . .”84 The court was careful to note that 
its holding would have no effect on either the football team’s use of the mark or 
its fans’ use of the mark.85 Rather, the future of the REDSKINS mark was en-
tirely “a business judgment beyond the purview of this Court’s jurisdiction.”86 
III. TAM 
Simon Tam sought to register the mark THE SLANTS to identify his 
band.87 While “slant” is a racist slur against Asian Americans,88 Tam, an Asian 
American himself, chose the name in order to “reclaim” the slur.89 The PTO, 
however, refused to register the mark based on its disparaging nature.90 Tam 
appealed,91 and possibly because he was a more sympathetic mark holder than 
a professional football team using the racist slur of another group, his case 
moved speedily through the courts and resulted in a Supreme Court decision.  
The stance of the SLANTS and REDSKINS cases were not the same. In 
the REDSKINS case, the marks were already registered, and an outside group 
of Native Americans was petitioning to cancel them.92 In the SLANTS case, 
Tam was being blocked from registering his mark by the Trademark Office, 
with no outside group involved.93 However, their similarities are more im-
portant: in both cases, the purported mark holder was deprived of federal regis-
tration based on the disparaging nature of the proposed mark. The decisions an-
alyzing these two similar cases could not be more different, though. The 
 
Circuit’s Conflation of Federal Trademark Registration and the First Amendment, 98 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 512, 523 (2016). 
81  See In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 640 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that registration allowed 
trademark holders “to call upon the resources of the federal government in order to enforce 
that mark.”). 
82  See Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 462. 
83  In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486. 
84  Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 490. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1754 (2017). 
88  Id. at 1751. 
89  Id. at 1751, 1754; see also id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
90  Id. at 1754. 
91  Id. 
92  See supra Section II.A. 
93  See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1754. 
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REDSKINS case, relying on decades of trademark law, was careful to focus on 
the commercial aspects of trademarks. The Tam court swept those decades 
away with a different characterization of trademarks: rather than being about 
distinguishing goods in the marketplace—which the Court acknowledged was 
the definition of a trademark94—the Court asserted that “trademark had ex-
panded far beyond phrases that do no more than identify a good or service.”95 
The Court basically introduced an entirely new definition of trademark: “catchy 
phrases that convey a message.”96 This is a definition that sounds suspiciously 
like something we would previously have called protected by copyright.  
A. What Tam Says 
The REDSKINS case focused entirely on trademark registration as the 
harm, emphasizing repeatedly that the football team could continue to use the 
mark in commerce.97 In this way, the REDSKINS case was explicitly not about 
expression; the football team was still free to express itself in its mark.  
The REDSKINS case never mentioned copyright, never addressed view-
point discrimination, and emphasized the public interest in not having the gov-
ernment invest resources into registering disparaging marks.98 
Tam, on the other hand, did exactly the opposite. Tam immediately began 
by pronouncing trademarks to be a form of expression. While it paid lip service 
to the original understanding of the purpose of trademarks99 and also acknowl-
edged that registration did not affect the use or protection of marks in the mar-
ketplace,100 it continued to focus its decision on its proclamation that trade-
marks were really “catchy phrases.”101 
The Court therefore disagreed with the REDSKINS court: this was not a 
case about government speech102 or government-subsidized speech,103 but 
about private speech.104 The Court viewed the disparaging statute as viewpoint 
discrimination, not because it was elevating any particular viewpoint, but be-
 
94  See id. at 1751 (quoting B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 
1299 (2015)) (“The principle underlying trademark protection is that distinctive marks—
words, names, symbols, and the like—can help distinguish a particular artisan’s goods from 
those of others.”). 
95  Id. at 1752. 
96  Id. 
97  See supra Section II.A. 
98  See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 489 (E.D. Va. 2015), vacated, 
709 F. App’x 182 (4th Cir. 2018). 
99  See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1752 (quoting S.F Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 
483 U.S. 522, 531 (1987)) (“[T]rademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality 
by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.”). 
100  See id. (citing 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 19:8). 
101  Id. 
102  See id. at 1760. 
103  Id. at 1761. 
104  Id. at 1760. 
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cause disparagement itself was a viewpoint.105 For this reason, the disparage-
ment clause was doomed.106 Simultaneously, however, much as trademarks 
both do and do not have a message depending on the section of the opinion,107 
the disparagement statute discriminated on the basis of viewpoint and also did 
not discriminate enough on the basis of viewpoint.108 Apparently if, instead of 
carefully attempting to prohibit all trademarks of a certain type, the trademark 
statute had instead prioritized the viewpoints it agreed with, it might have had a 
better chance of surviving the Court’s review.109 
B. How Tam Is Wrong 
Tam, a case theoretically all about trademark law, mentions preventing 
confusion in the marketplace—one of the goals of trademark law110—twice, in 
passing, in the entire case.111 Ordinarily, that purpose is kept at the forefront of 
trademark analyses.112 Instead, the Supreme Court’s entire analysis is un-
moored from trademark law’s traditional underpinnings.113  
Once trademarks are about expression and not the marketplace, then any 
regulation of them becomes highly suspect. The Supreme Court expressed fear 
that the disparagement clause “could silence or muffle the expression of disfa-
vored viewpoints.”114 But the point of trademarks should not be about expres-
sion. Those viewpoints can be widely expressed everywhere. The point of the 
trademark is the marketplace.  
 
105  See id. at 1763. 
106  Id. 
107  Compare id. at 1752, with id. at 1760. 
108  See id. at 1764–65. 
109  Justice Thomas’s concurrence argued that he would have applied strict scrutiny whether 
the speech was commercial or not, arguing that the government cannot restrict “truthful 
speech.” Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This 
adds another layer of complication. While trademark law has an understanding of misleading 
and deceptive trademarks, and also an understanding of truthful speech in the realm of ad-
vertising, it’s unclear what a “truthful” trademark is. Is Apple a truthful trademark? Is Nike? 
SLANTS might be truthful as applied to a band composed of Asian Americans but 
REDSKINS applied to a football team with no Native Americans arguably is not. Justice 
Thomas’s argument further betrays the harmful misunderstanding of trademarks that mere 
classification of “speech” is doing in the analysis. 
110  See e.g., Conrad, supra note 45, at 90; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: 
Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 410 (1990). 
111  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1753. 
112  See e.g., Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 2015); Stewart 
Surfboards, Inc. v. Disney Book Grp., LLC, No. CV 10-2982 GAF (SSx), 2011 WL 
12877019, at *1–2, *6 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011). 
113  See Tushnet, First Amendment, supra note 44, at 411 (worrying, prior to the Matal opin-
ion, that “the Supreme Court’s condemnation of content-based regulation . . . has now be-
come detached from the underlying justifications that one might reasonably give for worry-
ing about content-based regulation.”). 
114  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758 (emphasis added). 
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Because the Court was focused on viewpoint, its entire characterization of 
the trademark registration process appeared skewed and incorrect. “[A]n exam-
iner does not inquire whether any viewpoint conveyed by a mark is consistent 
with Government policy or whether any such viewpoint is consistent with that 
expressed by other marks already on the principal register,”115 stated the Court. 
But trademarks aren’t about expressing viewpoints, so it only makes sense that 
trademark examiners are not keeping track of their viewpoints. Indeed, with 
most trademarks it would be difficult to discern any viewpoint at all to keep 
track of, other than the viewpoint of marketplace distinction. Examiners do in-
quire whether the mark is consistent with government policy on many grounds 
(including deceptiveness, genericism, and descriptiveness) and make sure the 
mark is consistent with other marks already on the principal register in terms of 
not causing marketplace confusion.116 The fact that this is the focus of the 
trademark registration process is unsurprising, since that is the focus of trade-
marks, rather than expressiveness. 
The Court also understated the government’s oversight of registered 
trademarks, implying that, once a trademark is registered, the government has 
nothing more to do with the trademark.117 The Court noted that there are cir-
cumstances where the mark might be removed but used the passive voice to de-
fine those circumstances (“the registration expires”).118 The truth, however, is 
that registrations do not spontaneously expire. Rather, they expire because the 
government requires periodic confirmation of use and cancels registrations that 
do not provide it with those confirmations.119 So, in fact, the PTO is authorized 
to remove marks from the registry, and indeed actively polices them for that 
purpose.120 
The Court’s characterization of trademarks as forms of expression also 
skewed the Court’s interpretation of the government speech question. The 
Court found that the government was not speaking when the government regis-
tered trademarks, because instead of viewing that government speech as being 
about the marks as marketplace tools, the Court cast that speech as being about 
the marks’ expressive messages:  
For example, if trademarks represent government speech, what does the Gov-
ernment have in mind when it advises Americans to ‘make.believe’ (Sony), 
‘Think different’ (Apple), ‘Just do it’ (Nike), or ‘Have it your way’ (Burger 
King)? Was the Government warning about a coming disaster when it registered 
the mark ‘EndTime Ministries’?121 
 
115  Id. 
116  See Tushnet, First Amendment, supra note 44, at 389–90. 
117  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758. 
118  Id. 
119  See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 19:135. 
120  Id. 
121  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1759. 
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But, again, this is an odd way to view trademarks. Trademarks are not 
about directing people to do things (unless that thing is to buy their products). 
The Court could just as well have asked what the Government had in mind 
when it advised people to Apple or Nike. Apple and Nike are both trade-
marks,122 doing what trademarks are supposed to do in identifying products, 
and the absurdity of trying to convert those words into expressive phrases illus-
trates the wrong footing of the Court’s decision. The Court claimed that 
“[c]ompanies spend huge amounts to create and publicize trademarks that con-
vey a message.”123 But what those companies spend huge amounts to do is to 
link their marks with their goods and services. The message the companies are 
conveying is source identifying in nature. That’s what a trademark is.124  
 
This is an error the Court made again and again throughout the opinion. 
The Court asked, “[i]s it conceivable that commerce would be disrupted by a 
trademark saying: ‘James Buchanan was a disastrous president’ or ‘Slavery is 
an evil institution’?”125 Maybe not, but again, those seem much less like trade-
marks used to sell goods and much more like slices of political debate.126 It is 
unclear in what way consumers might view those as source-identifying state-
ments,127 primarily because the Supreme Court’s analysis has divorced trade-
marks from their definitional foundation of being used to identify a good or 
service. 
Even if there are some expressive elements to some trademarks, trademark 
registration, which was at issue here, is a commercial decision.128 The Court 
 
122  Indeed, the protection of slogans itself represents an expansion of trademark law. See 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 373–74 (1999). The Su-
preme Court’s examples could themselves be considered questionable trademarks by some 
criteria. 
123  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760. 
124  See Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 319, 321 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Trade-
marks designate the source or affiliation of goods and services in order to provide consumers 
with information about those goods and services, allowing mark holders to build and benefit 
from the reputation of their brands.”) (emphasis added); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 
332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003); Grynberg, supra note 47, at 185; Ned Snow, Free Speech 
& Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1639, 1653 (2016); Tushnet, First Amendment, 
supra note 44, at 395. 
125  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1765. 
126  Radiance Found., 786 F.3d at 327; Grynberg, supra note 47, at 190; Kuckes, supra note 
47, at 133. 
127  See Radiance Found., 786 F.3d at 329; Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. 
Gentile Prods. 134 F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n order to be protected as a valid 
trademark, a designation must create ‘a separate and distinct commercial impression, which 
. . . performs the trademark function of identifying the source of the merchandise to the cus-
tomers.’ ”) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Chem. Dynamics, Inc. 839 F.2d 1569, 1571 
(Fed. Cir. 1988)); Grynberg, supra note 47, at 190. 
128  Jurgensen, supra note 80, at 514. 
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acknowledged that trademarks are established via use and not registration,129 
but then found that registration affected use because without registration the 
mark holder would lose, (1) the ability to stop imports into the country, (2) the 
prima facie validity that could be asserted in court, (3) the “constructive notice” 
served by being on the government’s searchable list of trademarks, (4) and the 
ability to become “incontestable.”130 While Tam accurately listed the effects of 
registration, it provided the impression that these benefits are more advanta-
geous than they really are. One commentator characterized registration as the 
“T.S.A. Pre-Check” of trademarks:131 a nice, valuable, and encouraged bonus, 
but not necessarily disastrous to be without. While it is unmistakably valuable 
to be prima facie valid, it is not necessarily saving time or resources in litiga-
tion: “[N]o plaintiff’s attorney will introduce the registration as the sole evi-
dence of rights in the mark.”132 The “constructive notice” provision is helpful, 
but in the age of the internet such notice can be easily supplied by a simple 
Google search. Moreover, incontestability sounds like a wonderful thing to 
achieve, except for the fact that “incontestable” trademarks can actually be con-
tested on many grounds.133 Finally, the ability to block importation is unmis-
takably valuable but also controversial.134 
At any rate, Tam, a case theoretically about trademark registration, is most-
ly unconcerned with the ins and outs of trademark registration. Tam, at heart, is 
a decision that imagines itself as defending the marketplace of ideas through 
the First Amendment (even if those ideas are each owned by a single source). 
Tam itself acknowledged, though, that a marketplace flooded with ideas does 
not need trademark registration to protect it: “The commercial market is well 
stocked with merchandise that disparages prominent figures and groups.”135 By 
the Court’s own admission, a lack of trademark registration does not appear to 
be blocking these viewpoints from the marketplace.136 Given that observation, 
Tam stands out even more starkly. 
 
129  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751–52 (“[F]ederal law does not create trademarks.”) (quoting B & 
B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015)). 
130  Id. at 1753. 
131  Sarah Jeong, Should We Be Able to Reclaim a Racist Insult—as a Registered Trade-
mark?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/magazine/should-
we-be-able-to-reclaim-a-racist-insult-as-a-registered-trademark.html [https://perma.cc/4Y2 
U-9CBW]. 
132  6 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 32:154, at 32-379, n.3 (“No one to my knowledge has re-
lied in a court action upon his registration to prove his right to the trademark. Nor is anyone 
likely to do so.” (quoting Leslie D. Taggart, The Trial of a Trademark Case Before and After 
the Lanham Act, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 105 (1972))). 
133  See id. § 32:147. 
134  See id. § 29:44. 
135  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1765. 
136  Subsequent cases have continued to advance this confusing contradiction. A lack of 
trademark registration both simultaneously chills speech and does nothing to chill speech. 
See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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IV. WHY TAM IS DANGEROUS 
Tam’s sweeping proclamations treating trademarks as important expressive 
speech ignored decades of defining trademarks as not expressive speech. Previ-
ous courts had acknowledged the “communicative” value of trademarks as 
“symbols through which the public identifies the team and its players,”137 link-
ing the expressiveness of marks with their place in the consumer marketplace. 
“If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods 
by them,” proclaimed the Supreme Court in an early trademark decision.138 
As has been noted, courts had previously found that “no tangible form of 
expression [was] suppressed” by lack of trademark registration.139 Rather, be-
cause the public (as well as the trademark holder) could continue to discuss a 
trademark, regardless of its registration status, free speech was not implicat-
ed.140 The expressive value of the trademark seemed to be understood to belong 
to the consumers who needed to be able to utilize it in a crowded marketplace.  
Trademarks are properly understood as tools by which marketplace compe-
tition is streamlined and maximized; copyrights are expressive speech. Copy-
rights concern “original works of authorship.”141 Trademarks, on the other 
hand, are defined as “any word, name, [or] symbol . . . used . . . to identify and 
distinguish his or her goods . . . .”142 They are defined by their role in the mar-
ketplace and, indeed, unlike copyrights, which exist as soon as an original work 
is fixed in a tangible medium of expression,143 are developed only by and 
through consistent use in commerce.144 For this reason, under the disparage-
ment statute, the Trademark Office did not judge the objective disparaging na-
ture of the word at issue but rather its meaning as “used in connection with the 
goods and services identified in the registrations.”145 Trademarks are generally 
understood in the context of their “secondary” marketplace meaning linked to 
 
137  See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 62 F. Supp. 3d 498, 500 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
138  Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
139  In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
140  See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 455 (E.D. Va. 2015), vacated, 
709 F. App’x 182 (4th Cir. 2018). 
141  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
142  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 
(1992) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018)). 
143  See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 125 (D. D.C. 2003) (quoting 
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1739, 1999 WL 375907, at *36 (T.T.A.B. 
1999)). 
144  See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (“[T]he 
right to a particular mark grows out of its use . . . .”); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 16:1. 
145  In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981), abrogated by In re Tam, 808 F.3d 
1321 (F. Cir. 2015); see also Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 2014 
WL 2757516, at *4 (T.T.A.B. 2014) (citations omitted); In re Blvd. Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336, 
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003) citing In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
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goods or services.146 Even where secondary meaning was not required to pro-
tect the trademark, trademarks “provide[] a powerful way for a seller to pro-
mote and distinguish his or her products or services in the commercial market-
place.”147 Indeed, commentators have argued that where a term is too 
expressive it might not be able to effectively serve as a trademark.148 
Trademarks were therefore defined by their role in the marketplace, rather 
than as tools of expression. Courts had considered the Lanham Act constitu-
tional based on its regulation of this important commercial speech.149 Expres-
sive speech, more robustly protected by the First Amendment, occurred when 
trademarks were not being used in their trademark sense. Courts were able to 
draw a delineation in that way.150 Courts had generally been careful to apply 
the Lanham Act to marketplace interactions while leaving expressive occur-
rences unregulated.151 When a trademark had elements of both in its use, the 
courts developed an entirely separate test for balancing the goals of the trade-
mark laws and the First Amendment.152 In doing so, courts used the purpose of 
trademark law as preventing marketplace confusion to guide the limits of 
trademark statutes.153 
The Supreme Court, however, throughout Tam, rather than using trademark 
law’s purpose or examining whether the mark was being used commercially or 
expressively, insisted repeatedly that marks were simultaneously both commer-
cial and expressive. This effectively eliminates the idea that marks could ever 
be regulated as commercial speech. In this way, Tam destabilizes decades of 
trademark jurisprudence beyond just the disparagement statute. 
Tam was fixated on the government’s inability to regulate copyrights in the 
way that it was regulating trademarks, as if they were equivalent and inter-
changeable species of intellectual property.154 The answer, of course, is that a 
ruling on a trademark is not identical to a ruling on a copyright because they 
are two very distinct pieces of intellectual property. Trademarks and copyrights 
do not have the same definitions,155 requirements,156 registration process,157 re-
 
146  Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 (1979); Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 
316, 327 (4th Cir. 2015); Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1999). 
147  Kuckes, supra note 47, at 127. 
148  See Grynberg, supra note 47, at 179; Wilf, supra note 146, at 37. 
149  Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003). 
150  See id.; Stewart Surfboards, Inc. v. Disney Book Grp., LLC, No. CV 10-2982 GAF 
(SSx), 2011 WL 12877019, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011). 
151  See, e.g., Taubman, 319 F.3d at 776–78; Tushnet, First Amendment, supra note 44, at 
385. 
152  See Stewart Surfboards, 2011 WL 12877019, at *3. 
153  Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 321–22 (4th Cir. 2015) (“The Lanham 
Act and First Amendment may be in tension at times, but they are not in conflict so long as 
the Act hews faithfully to the purposes for which it was enacted.”)(citations omitted). 
154  See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017). 
155  See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 6:3. 
156  See id. 
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newal process,158 terms of enforcement,159 rights of enforcement,160 constitu-
tional justification,161 statutory schemes,162 common law precedent,163 or tradi-
tional policy goals.164 The only way a difference in legal treatment between 
copyrights and trademarks is problematic is if trademarks and copyrights are 
the same thing. 
If the Court’s view of trademarks was that they are expressive, it makes 
sense that the Court seemed determined to equate them with copyrights: that is, 
in fact, exactly what that statement means. The Court explicitly acknowledged 
as much when it expressed that there is no reason to treat trademarks and copy-
rights differently if both doctrines revolve around expressive speech.165 The 
Court equated the registration of trademarks and copyrights because it was 
treating them identically.166 The Court kept requiring the government to explain 
why it did not monitor disparaging copyrights, unpersuaded by the fact that the 
reason for this is that copyright and trademarks serve two different functions in 
society.167 This equating of copyrights and trademarks has continued, unsur-
prisingly, in the cases applying Tam.168 
This is especially confusing given the Court’s recent ruling in Dastar,169 
which seemed to acknowledge that trademarks and copyrights serve different 
functions that should be kept separated. There, the Court was “ ‘careful to cau-
tion against misuse or over-extension’ of trademark and related protections.”170 
Here, the Court seems less concerned. 
It seems that what has happened here is the Court has succumbed to the 
copymark creep that has been happening between these two doctrines over the 
course of the past few decades. Much as copyright holders have persistently 
tried to use trademark law to expand beyond the limits of copyright protection, 
seeking “permanent copyrights” in trademark’s indefinite term and attempting 
 
157  See id. § 6:13. 
158  See id. 
159  See id. 
160  See id. § 6:14. 
161  See id. § 6:2. 
162  See id. § 6:13. 
163  See id. 
164  See id. § 6:3. 
165  See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017) (“[t]he Government attempts to distin-
guish copyright on the ground that it is ‘the engine of free expression,’ . . . but as this case 
illustrates, trademarks often have an expressive content”) (citations omitted) (quoting Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003)). 
166  Id. 
167  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760. 
168  See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[n]o doubt many works regis-
tered with the Copyright Office offend a substantial composite of the general public. There 
are words and images that we do not wish to be confronted with, not as art, nor in the mar-
ketplace.”). 
169  Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003). 
170  Id. at 34 (citations omitted). 
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to equate copyright infringement inquiries of substantial similarity with trade-
mark’s consumer confusion tests,171 trademark holders have simultaneously 
sought the expansiveness of their rights with the more robust First Amendment 
protection placed around copyrighted works. This has led to a situation where 
the lines between copyright and trademark have become so blurred as to be-
come indistinguishable. The Supreme Court in Tam had an opportunity to rede-
fine the line and instead embraced its fuzziness. In fact, the Supreme Court 
even obscured the fuzziness it was introducing, insisting that the decision it was 
making presented “no difficult question,”172 even though it could not cobble 
together a majority of support for all parts of its underlying reasoning.173 
This is dangerous because the doctrines of trademark and copyright are 
both important and work in tandem to provide the best of both worlds: a vibrant 
creative culture and a clear competitive marketplace. Conflating the two risks 
losing this multi-layered richness in favor of the primacy of one over the oth-
er—or, even worse, ensuring the creative culture and the competitive market-
place are simply one and the same. Tam especially seems to provide the Su-
preme Court’s blessing to making trademarks look more like copyrights—
which has troubling implications in a number of ways. 
A. Consumer Protection 
Trademark, unlike copyright, was traditionally about consumer protec-
tion.174 This makes it market focused and regulated and hence a very different 
doctrine from copyright law. The limits on trademark registration spring from 
Congressional concern about particular consumer issues,175 but the Court in 
Tam was dismissive of consumer protection being used to justify the Trade-
mark Office’s regulations. The argument that the disparagement statute had 
been intended to protect consumers in the marketplace was met with disdain by 
the Court when it collided with the First Amendment; the First Amendment 
won the battle handily.176 In a world where trademarks’ consumer protective 
functions are secondary to the First Amendment, where does that leave the 
Lanham Act’s other consumer protective regulations? 
Tam, carried to its conclusion, states that anything preventing trademark 
registration could be a First Amendment infringement—and the Trademark Of-
fice has multiple regulations that in the wake of Tam look like at least content-
based restrictions on speech.177 “Trademark registration is in its entirety about 
 
171  See Lantagne, supra note 5, at 462, 467, 496. 
172  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760–61. 
173  See Conrad, supra note 45, at 89; Kuckes, supra note 47, at 122–23. 
174  1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2:24. 
175  See supra Part III. 
176  See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764. 
177  See Snow, supra note 124, at 1641, 1662 (“At its core, trademarks function through con-
tent discrimination.”). 
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regulating speech . . . .”178 As Rebecca Tushnet has argued, “disparagement 
can’t coherently be distinguished from a number of the other bars to registra-
tion once the harsh logic of the First Amendment applies.”179 
For instance, several trademark regulations refuse the registration of marks 
that are deceptive.180 This protects consumers from a variety of misleading 
marks that would complicate buying decisions. It does not seem viable, howev-
er, to treat trademarks as commercial speech for some purposes and expressive 
speech for others,181 especially not when the Supreme Court in Tam seems to 
support a default of treating trademarks as expressive, full stop. What justifica-
tion is there to protect consumers from deception if doing so would stifle the 
trademark holder’s ability to speak?182 Deceptiveness would seem to be as 
much a viewpoint as disparagement.183 Indeed, arguably REDSKINS is a de-
ceptive mark, as the football team is not known for its Native American play-
ers. Could the mark be cancelled as deceptive, rather than disparaging? 
At any rate, while subsequent analyses have seemed careful to leave plenty 
of room for the Lanham Act to continue to regulate misleading or deceptive 
marks,184 it is unclear if Tam’s analysis should at least require a re-examination 
of the PTO’s standards.185 After all, the PTO’s standards for analyzing decep-
tiveness do not depend on any kind of objective deceptiveness so much as they 
depend on consumer belief about the viewpoint that mark is conveying.186 This 
test looking at consumer perception is similar to the test for disparagement and 
would seem to be questionable for its reliance on consumer viewpoint to settle 
the question. On the other hand, it would be impossible to ask the PTO to judge 
deceptiveness outside of the context of consumer viewpoint, given that trade-
marks are about marketplace messages. Does that leave the PTO’s regulation of 
deceptiveness questionable altogether? 
One assumes that the traditional prohibitions against fraud or other false 
speech could be applied,187 but this would require strict showings that might be 
difficult to establish,188 especially for a consumer. Finally, it is simply not clear 
from the Court’s ruling in Tam how to distinguish deceptiveness from disparag-
ing marks. The Tam Court’s understanding of viewpoint discrimination was ex-
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tremely broad on the one hand and extremely narrow on the other.189 Where 
does the viewpoint of “deceiving people” fall on this spectrum, in the vacuum 
of Tam that is not concerned with confusion? Moreover, the concurrence casu-
ally stated that misleading trademarks and other consumer protection measures 
will survive this ruling, singling the disparagement clause out as being more 
about speech than other provisions of the trademark statute.190 But there is little 
explanation for how that distinguishing should happen in practice. 
Nor is the idea that Tam has called into question other aspects of the Lan-
ham Act far-fetched, as the statute’s prohibition on immoral and scandalous 
marks has already been declared unconstitutional based on Tam’s First 
Amendment analysis.191 The government’s main argument in the case at issue 
was, again, dependent on trademarks not being considered expressive 
speech.192 However, given Tam’s reasoning, that argument was a non-starter.193 
The court echoed the definition of trademarks that emphasized their expres-
siveness: “[T]rademarks exist to convey messages throughout commerce.”194 
This is a true statement, but the content of those messages was always under-
stood to be about the commercial transaction, rather than untethered from the 
goods or services the trademarks identify.195 
The sweeping language of Tam likewise could have implications for de-
scriptive marks.196 Trademark law limits the registration of descriptive marks, 
restricting protection to only those situations where the marks have gained a 
secondary meaning.197 The reason for this is that we have traditionally worried 
that such marks convey not entirely source-identifying information but rather 
other information about the good or service, which must be available to use by 
others in the marketplace.198 However, the Tam Court undercuts that justifica-
tion by failing to resolve the dispute on that particular point. Tam and his amici 
argued that some “trademarks do not simply identify the source of a product or 
service but go on to say something more, either about the product or service or 
some broader issue,”199 and the Court agreed that that was the case here and 
then explicitly dodged resolving the issue.200 In this way, the Court left open 
the question that trademarks that “say something” about a product or service 
might be entitled to greater protection—exactly what descriptive trademarks 
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might be classed as.201 Indeed, arguably SLANTS itself could have been 
termed descriptive of the members of the Asian American band it is identify-
ing,202 far more so than REDSKINS is descriptive of the football team. Could 
SLANTS—a trademark imbued with so much expressive value by the Court—
be cancelled as descriptive? Or would that be too much of an infringement of 
Tam’s free speech? 
Brunetti applied helpful limiting language to Tam’s analysis, discussing the 
provisions of the Lanham Act, at least in passing, with their purpose in terms of 
consumer protection.203 But, continuing the trend set in Tam, that portion of the 
analysis was cursory and tangential, with the greater part of the focus being on 
the expressive speech of trademarks rather than the statute’s consumer protec-
tion goals.204 Moreover, Brunetti continued the tendency to make broad, gener-
alized statements about trademark law: “[T]he government does not have a 
substantial interest in promoting certain trademarks over others,”205 the court 
proclaimed, even though it seemed like even the court thought that the govern-
ment does have a substantial interest in promoting non-deceptive trademarks.206 
But such a broad, declarative statement makes it sound like that is not true, af-
ter all. 
Trademark regulations also prevent the registration of marks that are “pri-
marily merely a surname. . . .”207 Traditionally, this was to make sure that no 
one person (or, more likely, corporation) could own a name without having de-
veloped a secondary meaning to justify that ownership.208 The fear was owning 
a name could prevent all others with that name from using it.209 However, Tam 
has flipped that concern around: if a surname mark is expressive, what is the 
justification for other people preventing you from registering it?210  
Trademark law also does not allow anyone to own a “generic” term, leav-
ing that to the public for general use.211 But, again, is there any justification for 
refusing to allow people the “expression” of owning particular terms?212 There 
must be—but unfortunately Tam’s ruling leaves it to future courts to delineate a 
line in Tam’s fuzziness. 
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B. Dilution Issues 
Commentators have had many issues with dilution law over the years.213 
Dilution is an extremely expansive area of the law that has sometimes been 
thought to be in danger of swallowing all of trademark law whole.214 However, 
trademark holders have generally believed that dilution law is a necessary pro-
tection.215 
Dilution law might be unconstitutional under Tam’s standards. Dilution 
law prohibits anyone from “tarnishing” a famous trademark, but “tarnishment” 
seems like a form of viewpoint discrimination equal to “disparagement.” Tar-
nishment occurs when a “trademark is . . . portrayed in an unwholesome or un-
savory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner’s prod-
uct.”216 The only speech targeted is that which harms reputation, while that 
which provokes flattering thoughts can avoid a tarnishment label.217 Indeed, 
because dilution law is often as separated from the traditional confusion-
avoiding goals as Tam itself,218 Tam seems tailor-made to be applied to dilu-
tion. If trademark law cannot regulate disparagement, why should it be able to 
regulate tarnishment? Trademark holders may have gained a major victory in 
Tam, but they may not be pleased with the result as applied to dilution law. 
C. Destroying Public Debate and Conversation 
The most alarming thing Tam does, is in fact what Tam claimed it was 
striving not to do, potentially destroy public debate and conversation. Tam 
weighed the public interest as belonging to the commercial entities holding 
trademarks, rather than, as other courts had, to the public consumers engaging 
with the marketplace.219 In this way, Tam provides the trademark owner with 
rights without adequate regard for the social cost exacted in exchange.220 Tam 
has elevated all trademarks to the “special circumstance” of a “broader public 
interest” than solely marketplace considerations that the Court had previously 
discussed.221 
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Tam, in so casually dismissing the very definition of a trademark as identi-
fying a source of a good in commerce, seems to eliminate much of the teeth be-
hind the idea of commercial speech.222 If trademarks, the quintessential mar-
ketplace communication, are expressive, after all, there is probably nothing that 
any entity can do that is not expressive. And this is explicitly the opposite of 
the First Amendment problem that scholars used to worry would result from 
trademark law. 
For most of trademark jurisprudence, courts worried that granting trade-
marks over expressive speech would threaten free speech: “But when a trade-
mark owner asserts a right to control how we express ourselves . . .[,] the full 
weight of the public’s interest in free expression” had to be taken into ac-
count.223 Courts, instead of defining trademarks as conveying the trademark 
holder’s expression, were actually concerned when a trademark had “a meaning 
beyond its source-identifying function.”224 Granting ownership over those 
trademarks, it was thought, threatened the ability of any other person to express 
those expressive ideas, and that seemed like a limitation and destruction of pub-
lic debate.225 “[W]hen symbols take on a set of non-source-identifying mean-
ings in popular culture, it is argued that the public has an interest in accessing 
and even modifying those meanings in cultural discourse, irrespective of the 
interests of the mark owner.”226 After all, “[o]ur language and our culture are 
impoverished when we cannot use the most familiar words to discuss—or make 
fun of, or criticize—the products and companies that are the basis of our econ-
omy.”227 
In this way, it was a First Amendment violation to permit any one entity to 
own expressive speech and exclude others from using that speech.228 “The risk 
of impinging on protected speech is much greater when trademarks serve not to 
identify goods but rather to obstruct the conveyance of ideas, criticism, com-
parison, and social commentary.”229 In such a situation, the trademark is not 
identifying the source; rather, the trademark is identifying the message “that the 
[user] supports the ideas and messages conveyed by” the expressive mark.230 
The First Amendment, it has long been understood, exists to “guarantee[] 
. . . the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern 
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without previous restraint . . .,”231 with a “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open . . . .”232 In supporting the idea that people must be permitted to own ex-
pressive speech, the Supreme Court jeopardizes that very lack of restraint on 
public issues. In classifying trademarks as expressive, the Supreme Court has 
turned public debate into a regulated commercial marketplace, “restrict[ing] the 
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of 
others . . . .”233 This is an act that in itself the Court has found to be “wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment.”234 Here, it is the very result the Court, in the 
name of the First Amendment, has welcomed. 
In Tam, the Supreme Court has invited a trademark regime where, in fact, 
trademark holders can stifle public debate by registering a multitude of expres-
sive trademarks. Tam assumes that, to the extent trademarks have a message to 
convey, that message is that of the trademark holder,235 whereas other commen-
tators in other contexts have argued that consumers convey a message with the 
trademarked goods and services that they purchase.236 As one commentator 
noted in the context of post-sale confusion trademark infringement cases, the 
entity was “selling others the means to express a message . . . but [was] not ex-
pressing such a message” itself.237 The consumer’s First Amendment right in 
expression is nowhere to be found in the Tam opinion. 
Instead, Tam allows entities to trademark the most disparaging things peo-
ple can say about them—mainly, to be able to use trademark protections to sue 
people who say those disparaging things about them.238 While trademark pro-
tection is limited to the goods and services on which those marks are used, 
there have already been some attempts to use trademarks on services described 
as “[p]roviding information,”239 which sounds suspiciously close to just pos-
sessing a trademark on discussion. Even if such trademarks are rejected by the 
Trademark Office as being commercially inappropriate (and assuming the 
courts will agree that the Trademark Office is permitted to deprive the speaker 
of these trademark rights), the ongoing expansiveness of trademark rights has 
allowed for at least the impression that capturing the cultural conversation on 
goods that matter to public debate, such as hats and t-shirts, is not only straight-
forward but encouraged and, indeed, the “right” way to do things. For instance, 
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the person who was seeking to register THE PISS TAPE IS REAL on a variety 
of merchandise was explicitly inspired by Tam to use his trademark to attack 
the President240—which does not sound like much of a marketplace use at all. 
The application has since been abandoned, but the perception lingers in the 
wake of Tam that trademarks are supposed to be used to tie up political speech. 
In this way, the Tam ruling could allow disparaging viewpoints to be driv-
en from the marketplace far more effectively than refusal of trademark registra-
tions ever did, because it explicitly allows for people to own particular dispar-
aging statements to the exclusion of other people using those statements.241 
Indeed, some people expressed the view that they had already applied to regis-
ter disparaging marks solely to keep other people from doing so.242 The general 
public seemed to take that as the lesson from Tam: “[T]hey desire[] to trade-
mark the word to prevent others from using it negatively.”243 Their understand-
ing seems to be that the Supreme Court has given the go-ahead to control polit-
ical debate using trademark law—and, to be honest, as has been discussed, it is 
hard to quarrel with that reading of the Supreme Court’s opinion.244 
Theoretically, there is a commercial boundary around the reach of trade-
mark law that would allow cultural conversation to still occur, but Tam’s 
sweeping statements and the realities of twenty-first century litigiousness mean 
that plenty of purely expressive speech can be chilled by ownership.245 Moreo-
ver, the expansion of many trademarks into merchandising increases the likeli-
hood that ownership of expressive trademarks will control the public’s own ex-
pression of messages,246 since merchandising by its very definition detaches the 
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trademark from its source-identifying purpose and views it as an engine of ex-
pression.247 If a mark holder gains the right to put its expressive phrase on a t-
shirt, can that mark holder then force everyone who agrees with its view to buy 
t-shirts expressing that view exclusively from the mark holder?248 After all, 
most people buying a t-shirt with a phrase emblazoned on it are doing it not for 
source-identification purposes but to convey their own view.249 
The REDSKINS decision was careful to point out that a refusal of registra-
tion would not drive the speech from the marketplace; Tam, by contrast, does 
exactly that, placing the speech in the mouth of one speaker and infringing on 
the rights of all other speakers to make a similar expression. Naturally, this 
danger can happen whenever one registers a trademark.250 “[A] trademark right 
allows its owner to suppress other uses.”251 However, the PTO’s guidelines 
were carefully constructed in light of the purposes of trademark law, to guaran-
tee that trademarks were used to identify sources of goods and not to convey 
expression.252 If the expansion of trademark law had already raised concerns 
that trademark holders have “too much control over what others may say, di-
rectly or indirectly, about their marks,”253 Tam has exacerbated the problem. 
Tam acknowledged that there are millions of registered trademarks.254 In 
fact, all of the most common words are also trademarks.255 Expanding protec-
tion over all of them as important expressive speech rather than as commercial 
speech can have significant repercussions to free speech—in the stifling sense 
rather than freeing sense.256 After all, in the wake of Tam, all we really know is 
that Simon Tam owns a right to a particular racial slur and can use that right to 
prevent others from using that slur. Indeed, given the prevalence of preliminary 
injunctions in trademark cases, he could even prevent others’ uses of that ex-
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pressive term without any discussion of the usual First Amendment concerns 
about prior restraint.257 On the whole, maybe the Supreme Court has achieved a 
secret goal of limiting disparaging speech by granting ownership of it to limited 
entities. 
CONCLUSION 
Tam is dangerous because the Court’s analysis missed the point: trade-
marks are not expressive speech. In fact, when trademarks become expressive, 
we should as a society be worried. Instead, the Tam Court exalted trademarks’ 
expressive nature. Instead of urging those with expressive interests to go to 
copyright law for their protections, the Tam Court decided to prioritize the 
viewpoint of whoever rushes to the PTO first, over the viewpoints of literally 
everyone else in society. Tam leaves the door open for a large variety of ex-
pressive speech to be owned by one particular entity who controls the public 
discussion about a topic. 
There were ways to decide Tam without making such a sweeping procla-
mation on trademarks’ expressiveness. After all, in previous trademark deci-
sions courts had mostly been able to avoid the thicket of the First Amendment. 
It is curious that Tam ignored so many of the cogent technical problems with 
the disparagement statute. The statute often seemed vague,258 which could have 
doomed it. Arguably, the PTO did not even follow its own precedent in reject-
ing the mark, since there was a convincing argument to be heard that SLANTS, 
acting as it did as a reclamation of the slur in connection with an Asian Ameri-
can band, was not disparaging as applied to its goods and services—which was 
the theoretical PTO standard for disparaging marks. In addition, the Court 
could have wrestled more with the marketplace justification for the disparage-
ment clause, focusing on trademarks’ traditional definition to overturn the 
clause as not advancing consumer protection, while maintaining the bedrock 
that the Lanham Act’s focus was on commercial speech, not expressive 
speech.259 The Kennedy Concurrence comes closest to this sort of analysis, alt-
hough it is brief and cursory.260 Finally, “[e]ven pure commercial speech is en-
titled to significant First Amendment protection.”261 The Tam Court did not 
need to convert trademarks into expressions to reach a holding that the dispar-
agement clause was unconstitutional. 
 
257  See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
258  See Conrad, supra note 45, at 144; Tushnet, First Amendment, supra note 44, at 413. 
259  See Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003); Kuckes, supra note 
47, at 165; Tushnet, First Amendment, supra note 44, at 387–88. 
260  See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“Whether a mark is disparaging bears no plausible relation to that goal [of facili-
tating source identification].”). Many of these analyses are mentioned more fully in Brunetti, 
although they are necessarily subordinate to the Supreme Court’s broader rulings. 
261  ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 925 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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Instead of any of these other options, Tam chose to focus on a First-
Amendment analysis of trademarks being expressive rather than a commercial 
analysis. In one way, maybe this was not at all surprising. Mark Lemley has al-
ready noted that “courts have not been sufficiently sensitive to legitimate free 
speech concerns in cases where trademark owners seek to restrict noncompeti-
tive uses of the trademark.”262 Tam, in continuing in this line, seems to endorse 
the copymark creep that has been happening over the last few decades, conflat-
ing the two doctrines together as a foregone conclusion. Ordinarily, one would 
have said that if one cannot get a trademark, then one ought to try to get a copy-
right.263 And maybe one might not be able to get a copyright, either, but if that 
is the case then it is because we made a decision that no one should be able to 
own the particular expression at issue. Instead, Tam has converted trademark 
law into an expansion of copyright and thus intellectual property ownership. 
What does it mean for all of us when the protection of speech is translated to 
the right to own that speech? 
Tam is a dangerous precedent and should serve as an illustration of the 
possibly unintended consequences that will continue to result when we blur 
trademark and copyright indiscriminately. Doing so endangers the viability and 
effectiveness of both intellectual property regimes—and, ironically, of the very 
robust First Amendment-protected discourse Tam purported to protect. 
 
262  Lemley, supra note 213, at 1697. 
263  Id. 
